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Abstract
This paper examines young people’s exits from joblessness using recent survey data
for Northern Ireland. A reduced form search model is estimated, allowing for a fully
flexible specification of the baseline hazard function, with young people exiting
joblessness into either employment or education and training. There is evidence of
negative duration dependence in the conditional probability of exiting joblessness.
The relationship is not monotonic, however, there being a small ‘spike’ in the hazard
rate around 5-6 months consistent with an effect of the introduction of the New Deal
for Young People in 1998.
The paper argues that, given negative duration dependence, policy makers would do
better to increase targeted interventions on those facing the toughest barriers to
employment in the first month of joblessness, where possible, rather than wait for six
months as is the current case with New Deal. The main barriers to exit from
joblessness observable in the data include caring for a young child, having a family
background of unemployment and low levels of job search. Having poor
qualifications also acts as a barrier to exit from joblessness, particularly into
education. The introduction of Job Seekers Allowance in 1996 is correlated with
shorter jobless spells. Further research is suggested to examine these issues in more
detail, and in particular to examine in greater depth the effects of the introduction of
the New Deal on duration dependence in joblessness among young people.
11. Introduction
Throughout the 1980s and early 1990s unemployment amongst young people in the
UK stood at record high levels. In recent years, in the context of a new social
inclusion policy agenda, policy makers have come to recognise unemployment, and
particularly long-term unemployment, as a key mechanism by which young people
may become socially excluded.1 The need to arrest the drift into long-term
unemployment for many young people lies behind the UK government’s recent
introduction of a major active labour market policy for young people (the New Deal).
This follows earlier interventions such as the removal of unemployment benefits for
under-18s, the guarantee of a training place for all school leavers, and the tightening
of benefit eligibility for all unemployed persons following the introduction of the Job
Seeker’s Allowance (JSA). These policy concerns and interventions have all extended
to Northern Ireland (NI) also.
A major question still not adequately resolved in the applied labour economics
literature is whether young people become less likely to find employment the longer
they find themselves in unemployment. In other words, is there negative duration
dependence in youth unemployment? Such duration dependence may result from
skills deterioration or dwindling motivation for job search (e.g. Phelps, 1972; Layard
et al., 1991), or because potential employers see unemployment as a signal of poor
productivity (e.g. Blanchard and Diamond, 1994). The lack of a clear consensus is
partly the result of difficulties in distinguishing ‘true’ duration dependence from
‘spurious’ duration dependence. In short, ‘true’ duration dependence (unemployment
causes unemployment) may be observationally equivalent to unobserved individual
heterogeneity that increases individuals’ propensity to be unemployed at whatever
point in time. People may be long-term unemployed because they have poor job
prospects rather than people having poor job prospects because they are long-term
unemployed (see Heckman and Borjas, 1980; Machin and Manning, 1999).
                                                          
1 “The best defence against social exclusion is having a job...” (Tony Blair, Social Excusion Unit,
1999).
2The existence or otherwise of duration dependence in unemployment for young
people has important policy implications, particularly for the New Deal. New Deal is
geared towards intervention after six months of unemployment and claiming benefits,
offering individually tailored guidance and support in job search; education, training
or subsidised employment placements; and voluntary work and ‘environmental
taskforce’ options (see Van Reenen, 2001, for a detailed account). If there is no
duration dependence, however, then there is no deterioration in young peoples’
employability during unemployment, and scarce resources might be better spent ex
ante on making sure young people leave school with marketable skills and
qualifications or on regeneration of disadvantaged communities than on ex post
intervention. Equally, if there is negative duration dependence, why wait six months
to intervene? Skills and motivation will have already been lost that may have been
maintained given earlier intervention. Presumably intervention has to be rationed for
resource reasons or because policy makers are not confident they can identify those
most at risk ex ante. A better policy might strengthen intervention in the first month
for all those thought to be at risk of long-term joblessness and maintain a New Deal
type intervention after six months as a safety net. Positive duration dependence would
reduce the need for intervention, since the unemployed would become more likely to
obtain employment the longer their unemployment spell. Finally, matters may be
complicated further if duration dependence is non-monotonic. For example, if
duration dependence is positive for the initial months before becoming negative, it
may be optimal to intervene earlier or later than six months, depending on where the
turning point is (or how long it takes an unemployed young person to begin to lose
‘employability’).
Following a recent trend in the literature, this paper examines duration dependence, in
our case in joblessness among young people, using the Prentice-Gloeckler non-
parametric methodology allowing for non-monotonicity in the duration relationship
(Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978). In other words, we do not restrict duration
dependence to be either positive or negative, but allow for different signs at different
durations. This method is less prone to bias from spurious duration dependence due to
unobserved heterogeneity than traditional parametric approaches (Narendranathan and
Stewart, 1993). Given the key role of post-16 education and training in the choice set
available to many young jobless, and in policy interventions aimed at helping young
3jobless, exits from joblessness into employment and into education and training are
identified separately in a competing risks framework, alongside a ‘pooled exits’
model. By using these techniques the paper aims to improve understanding of the
nature of duration dependence in joblessness for young people and to enable policy
interventions to be made more effectively.
The paper uses recent longitudinal survey data that follow a cohort of young people in
NI from when they are first eligible to leave school in the summer of 1993 until the
summer of 1999. This survey data allows us to focus on the wider definition of
joblessness (all those young people not in employment, education or training) in
preference to the narrower definitions of unemployment given by either ILO or the
claimant count.  The distinction between time spent ‘other jobless’ and time spent
unemployed may be small for young people (Lynch, 1989). Other studies argue that
joblessness and not unemployment should be the focus of research on young people
(e.g. Rees, 1986). Hannan (1998) and Portugal and Addison (2000) are recent
examples of duration analyses examining joblessness in preference to unemployment.
Our interest in the NI data in particular stems from three observations. First, NI
displays relatively high levels of joblessness, particularly long-term joblessness,
among young people, compared to most other UK regions (McVicar, 2000). Second,
the Good Friday Agreement has brought with it devolved government, and this
implies a need for research specific to NI if policy is to be evidence-based. Despite a
considerable unemployment duration analysis literature in GB, the US, and elsewhere,
we know of no existing study for NI. Third, our sample period spans the introduction
of two major policy initiatives aimed at improving the employment prospects of
young jobless – New Deal and JSA. As far as the data allow, we examine the effects
of these policy interventions on joblessness duration.
We find evidence of negative duration dependence in the conditional probability of
exiting joblessness into employment and in exiting joblessness overall. The
relationship is not monotonic, however, there being a small ‘spike’ in the hazard rate
around 5-6 months. We argue that this is consistent with a New Deal effect, where
both entry to the New Deal and expected entry to the New Deal stimulate additional
efforts to exit joblessness on the part of young people. Data limitations prevent a
4definitive examination of the overall effects of the introduction of New Deal on
young peoples’ joblessness duration, however. JSA is unambiguously correlated with
shorter joblessness spells for young people. A number of other factors are identified
that act as barriers to employment for young people, including a family background of
unemployment, having young children (for young women), and low levels of job
search. Poor qualifications also act as a barrier to escaping joblessness, particularly
into education or training.
The remainder of this paper is set out as follows. The following section discusses the
framework behind the study (a simple model of job search) and discusses the
approach to its estimation in the light of the existing empirical literature on
unemployment duration. Section 3 outlines the data and presents descriptive statistics.
Section 4 presents and discusses the results from estimation of our empirical model.
Section 5 concludes with policy implications and suggestions for further research.
52. The Framework
Like most of the existing empirical literature, search theory provides the starting point
for our model of joblessness duration. Jobless young people search for jobs, which
entails costs, at varying rates. Given our broad definition of joblessness, for some, e.g.
those caring for young children or those taking a ‘year out’ on holiday before
continuing education, this search rate may be close to zero. The probability of a
‘match’ at a given point in time (exiting joblessness into employment) is the product
of the probability of getting a job offer and the probability of accepting that job offer
(Mortensen, 1987). The probability of getting an offer is likely to depend on factors
such as search intensity, individual and local labour market characteristics. The
probability of accepting an offer is likely to depend on the level of the wage offer
relative to the individual’s reservation wage, which in turn may depend on factors
such as income during unemployment, past and expected earnings and other
individual characteristics.
We examine exits from joblessness into employment. Education and government
supported training, however, given often extended and complex transition patterns
from school to work, offer another possible route out of joblessness for young people.
Our search framework must therefore be extended to allow young people to search for
education and training places alongside the search for employment places. The
probability of getting an offer of an education or training place may depend on
existing qualifications, amongst other things. The probability of accepting such an
offer is likely to depend on financial considerations, the suitability of the education or
training place (e.g. where it is, the level of the qualification on offer) and some
optimising behaviour over expected present value utility of accepting the place or
continuing to search. Equation 1 shows the probability of exit from joblessness for
individual i at time t implied by this framework. We go on to estimate a reduced form
of this model.
6Pit(exit) = ∑
= 2,1j φitjηitj, (1)
where j = 1 (employment) or 2 (education/training) and φ and η denote the probability
of receiving and accepting an offer respectively, defined below.
 φitj = fj(Xit, Eit, ϕij), ηit1 = g1(wit(Xit, bit)), ηit2 = g2(qit(Xit, bit)), (2)
where Xit is a vector of individual characteristics, Eit are environmental characteristics
(e.g. local unemployment rate), ϕ denotes search intensity, wit and qit denote the wage
offer relative to the reservation wage and the ‘course offer’ relative to some
‘reservation course’ respectively, and bit denotes income during the jobless spell.
Standard search theory implies that the probability of getting a job offer is
independent of joblessness duration. Various extensions, however, can predict either
positive or negative duration dependence. If reservation wages fall with
unemployment duration, perhaps because of benefit exhaustion, then job offers will
be accepted more frequently and we might see positive duration dependence (e.g.
Mortensen, 1977). Conversely, Layard et al. (1991) suggest that as the unemployment
spell goes on, the unemployed worker might lose motivation for job search and this
might reduce the probability of getting a job offer implying negative duration
dependence. Phelps (1972) suggests that human capital might depreciate during an
unemployment spell, also reducing the chances of getting a job offer. Blanchard and
Diamond (1994) suggest that employers might see unemployment as a negative
productivity signal and be reluctant to hire previously unemployed workers. These
arguments may, at least to an extent, also apply to exits to education/training.
Where theory has been put forward that can argue negative or positive duration
dependence in unemployment, no duration dependence at all, or a combination of all
three, empirical research takes on added importance if we are to understand the true
relationships between unemployment duration and exit. Unfortunately, despite a
considerable empirical literature, both internationally and in GB, evidence is mixed.
Winter-Ebmer (1998), for example, finds evidence of positive duration dependence in
Austria. Lancaster (1979), Nickell (1979) and van den Berg and van Ours (1994) find
7evidence of negative duration dependence in GB. Narendranathan et al. (1985) and
Narendranathan (1993) find little evidence of duration dependence of either sign for
GB as do van den Berg and van Ours (1994) for France. Arulampalam and Stewart
(1995) and Boheim and Taylor (2000) find a non-linear (inverted u) relationship
between duration and exit probability.2 Finally, some studies find evidence of ‘spikes’
around the time of benefit exhaustion (e.g. Meyer, 1990; Carling et al., 1996) or other
policy interventions (e.g. Dolton and O’Neill, 1996a, b), although others do not (e.g.
Stancanelli, 1999). Reviews of this literature are provided by Devine and Kiefer
(1991) and Machin and Manning (1999). Studies examining duration dependence in
unemployment for young people specifically include Heckman and Borjas (1980),
Lynch (1989), Korpi (1995), and Russell and O’Connell (2001). Between them these
studies find evidence of no duration dependence, negative duration dependence and
non-linear duration dependence.
As argued above, one reason for this ambiguity is the observational equivalence of
duration dependence and unobserved heterogeneity. Failure to consider unobserved
heterogeneity can lead to a false conclusion of negative duration dependence because
of negative bias (Heckman and Borjas, 1980). Unobserved heterogeneity can also bias
the coefficients on the covariates. The standard approach to this unobserved
heterogeneity problem is to specify some mixing distribution for the hazard function
including a (parametric) ‘random effects’ error term element (e.g. Portugal and
Addison, 2000). A related alternative is to specify a non-parametric mass point
distribution  for   the  unobserved  heterogeneity   ( e.g.  Heckman  and  Singer,  1984;
                                                          
2 The curve illustrating the relationship between duration and exit probability at a given point in time
(conditional upon exit not having occurred already), other things being equal, is called the baseline
hazard function. If there is no duration dependence, such a hazard function will be horizontal. Negative
duration dependence corresponds to a downward sloping hazard function and positive duration
dependence to an upward sloping hazard function. Observed predetermined (time-invariant) factors
that might influence the probability of a match between vacancy and job seeker, such as qualification
level, essentially have the effect of shifting the baseline hazard function up or down (Portugal and
Addison, 2000). A tightening of the labour market, for example, might be expected to shift the hazard
function upwards, so increasing the chance of exit into employment at a given point in time.
8Kettunen, 1997; Stancanelli, 1999).3 Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) argue,
however, that there is no reason to believe that the resulting distortion from
introducing such specifications for unobserved heterogeneity is any less severe than
any distortion that would arise from ignoring the unobserved heterogeneity in the first
place. Including more observed covariates will help, but is not always possible given
data restrictions.
Arulampalam and Stewart (1995) argue that the duration dependence bias and the bias
on the coefficients of the covariates can be reduced by using a flexible specification
for the baseline hazard function (see also Ridder, 1987; Portugal and Addison, 2000).
In other words, given a sufficiently flexible baseline hazard specification, it becomes
unnecessary to model unobserved heterogeneity (Boheim and Taylor, 2000). In any
case a restrictive specification of the baseline hazard function (e.g. the relatively
common, and monotonic, Weibull) can in itself bias the results (Narendranathan and
Stewart, 1993). Given our interest in the possibility of a non-linear baseline hazard,
such a restrictive approach is not attractive. Many recent studies adopt a piecewise
constant baseline hazard that separates T (total time at risk) into different segments
with different hazard rates (e.g. Arulampalam and Stewart (1995); Narendranathan
and Stewart (1993); Bratberg and Vaage, 2000; Portugal and Addison, 2000; Boheim
and Taylor, 2000). This methodology was originally introduced by Prentice and
Gloeckler (1978). To allow flexibility in the shape of the baseline hazard function,
and to reduce the likelihood of bias resulting from unobserved heterogeneity, we
follow the Prentice-Gloeckler (PG) approach here.
The discrete time hazard rate for individual i in time interval t to exit joblessness into
activity j (employment or education/training) is given by Equation 3, where θj(t) is a
function relating the hazard rate with spell duration. The PG approach assumes there
is a specific parameter that is constant over each period identified. This parameter can
                                                          
3 Despite its widespread use in the empirical literature and its apparent attractiveness, the mass point
approach to modelling heterogeneity faces two principle difficulties. Firstly, it is not uncommon to
encounter computational difficulties in implementing the non-parametric maximum likelihood or mass
point estimator (see e.g. Baker and Melino, 2000). Secondly, although Heckman and Singer provide
conditions under which this non-parametric maximum likelihood estimator is consistent, there is as yet
no derivation of the sampling distribution of this estimator. Hence standard errors calculated by
conventional formulae (e.g. from the estimated information matrix) have no formal justification and
might well be misleading. For these reasons in this paper we adopt parametric specifications for
heterogeneity.
9be interpreted as the logarithm of the integral of the baseline hazard over the
particular time interval (Boheim and Taylor, 2000).
hjt(Xit) = 1 – exp{ -exp[Xit’βj + θj(t)]} (3)
The extension of the standard single risk model to two exit destinations is referred to
as the competing risks model (e.g. Boheim and Taylor, 2000). The two exits are
treated as independent, so the probability of exit into employment is assumed not to
depend on the probability of exit into education and vice versa. Kollmann (1994)
argues that negative duration dependence in terms of chances of getting a job might
lead to increasing exit from the labour market into economic inactivity, suggesting
that independent risks may not be a suitable assumption. However, we treat
economically inactive spells (outside of education) as unemployment spells in our
model, so this argument is less relevant here. Nevertheless, our independence
assumption rests on the belief that duration dependence in exits to employment does
not affect the likelihood of exits to education and training. Further research might
relax this assumption.
In practical terms, the independent competing risks framework treats other exits as
right censored (see Lancaster, 1990). Boheim and Taylor (2000) argue that the
distributional assumptions for including unobserved heterogeneity are even stronger
in the competing risks framework than in the standard single risk case, and are
therefore reluctant to assume any particular specification for such heterogeneity in
their model. Roed et al. (1999) add that the standard negative bias on duration
dependence of unobserved heterogeneity does not necessarily hold in a competing
risks framework. We estimate the competing risks model both with and without
specifying unobserved heterogeneity, following the extension to the PG methodology
proposed by Meyer (1990) and allowing for either a gamma distributed random effect
or a normally distributed random effect. The results are compared to the single risk
model where all exits are treated as homogenous and a single hazard function
estimated.
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3. The Data
The data are taken from the 1999 Status Zero Survey of young people first eligible to
leave school in NI in July 1993. A representative sample of 712 young people is
followed for 72 months from July 1993 until June 1999 (from age 16 to age 22).4 For
each individual we have detailed monthly activity information, including details of
job-search activities for spells of joblessness, along with considerable background
information including qualifications achieved in compulsory education and family
background details. This level of detail is generally not available from register data.
However, the benefits from using the survey data come at a cost mainly in terms of
sample size, but also in the potential for recall error such as ‘heaping’, where
respondents might ‘round-off’ past unemployment spells to the nearest six months, for
example (e.g. Torelli and Trivellato, 1993).
Around 35% of the sample from the Status Zero Survey have experienced at least one
spell of unemployment or other joblessness during the sample period. 24% have
experienced a spell of at least six months and 17% a spell of at least 12 months. The
figures for unemployment (using the ILO definition) are a little smaller but roughly in
proportion (see Table 1). Most young people who experience joblessness experience
only one spell, but a significant minority experience two or more spells (see Figure 1).
Our final sample for this paper is all spells of joblessness experienced by the Status
Zero Survey sample over the 72 months of the survey, n=357. Following Boheim and
Taylor (2000) we treat separate spells for the same individual as separate
observations.5
The focus on joblessness rather than narrower definitions of unemployment has a cost
in terms of including those individuals who describe themselves as being ‘on holiday’
– treated here as jobless spells. The numbers in this category are small, however, and
are identified by a binary dummy in the empirical model. This cost is offset by
                                                          
4 No jobless spells are possible before the first observation in the data set since all sample members are
in school, by definition, therefore there are no left-censored joblessness spells.
5 Boheim and Taylor (2000) and Russell and O’Connell (2001) argue that by including previous
unemployment experience in the explanatory variables, any correlation of the error terms for two spells
experienced by the same individual is unlikely to be a problem. We follow this approach largely for
reasons of sample size, and in any case we find no evidence of significant unobserved heterogeneity.
11
additional practical benefits of the focus on joblessness, including the fact that no
spells end for ‘artificial’ reasons, such as failure to sign on the unemployment register
in a given month.
For our sample of 357 jobless spells, the mean duration is 12 months (median 6
months – see Table 2). Given the inclusion of censored spells, these statistics will be
biased downwards (Boheim and Taylor, 2000). Around 26% of jobless spells in the
sample are right-censored. 68% of uncensored spells end in employment and the
remaining 32% end in education or training. The mean duration for spells ending in
employment is 9 months (median 5.5 months) compared to 8 months for spells ending
in education/training (median 3 months).
Figure 2 shows the distribution of spell duration. This too will be biased downwards
because of right censoring. Nevertheless, two points in particular stand out. Firstly,
many jobless spells for young people are short – between one and three months. Part
of the explanation for this lies in the summer periods between academic years,
particularly the initial summer period in 1993, where some young people describe
themselves as being on holiday, some claim to have looked unsuccessfully for a
summer job and others describe themselves as waiting for a job or education/training
place already obtained to begin. This partly explains the temporary peak in jobless
rates in the summer of 1993 and the smaller peak in the summer of 1994, shown in
Figure 3. Secondly, there is some suggestion of ‘heaping’ measurement error,
particularly at 24 months and perhaps at 48 months. We discuss the robustness of our
analysis to the possibility of such recall error in the following section.
Table 2 gives a life table for joblessness spells with all exits pooled and separately for
exits to employment and exits to education and training.6 A third of all spells do not
survive past three months. For exits to education and training, the proportion of spells
surviving into the fourth month is less than half. In general, joblessness spells ending
in education/training are shorter than those ending in employment.
                                                                                                                                                                     
Ondrich and Rhody (1999) discuss a generalisation of the likelihood to account for multiple spells but
make clear that it is far from straightforward. We leave this generalisation for later research.
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Explanatory variables for the empirical model are included according to two
considerations. First, as far as our data allow, we include those factors generally found
to influence unemployment or joblessness duration in existing studies. Second, we
include those factors particular to NI previously found to influence labour market
outcomes and education/training participation (e.g. community/religion and sub-
regional geography). Table 3 lists the explanatory variables for the (inclusive) model,
along with sample means and standard deviations.
Three policy dummy variables are included in the empirical model (and Table 3) to
capture the effects of the introduction of JSA and New Deal. The JSA dummy takes
the value one for all months in joblessness following the introduction of JSA, for all
individuals. A jobless spell spanning the introduction of JSA will correspond with
zero values for JSA before October 1996 and one thereafter. Two New Deal dummies
are included in the model. The first, NEWDEAL1, is defined in the same way as the
JSA dummy, with zeroes before April 1998 (the date of the introduction of New Deal)
and ones thereafter. This dummy is intended to capture the overall effect of New Deal
– on the labour market, on employer incentives and on incentives for jobless young
people in general. The second New Deal dummy, NEWDEAL2, is intended to capture
the effects of New Deal on eligible individuals only during their period of eligibility.
The variable takes the value zero for all months of joblessness before April 1998, and
for the first six months of any spells of jobless beginning after April 1998, and one
otherwise.7 Where jobless spells span the introduction of New Deal, the dummy takes
the value zero until the six-month threshold is reached or until April 1998, whichever
is later.
Table 3 also gives simple pairwise correlation coefficients for the explanatory
variables with the duration variable. Factors correlated with shorter spells of
joblessness (from the raw data) include having good qualifications at age 16 (5+
GCSEs at grades A-C), more job search activity, the New Deal and JSA dummies,
age at start of spell and the local unemployment rate. Factors correlated with longer
                                                                                                                                                                     
6 The employment category includes part-time employment where it is described as the primary
economic activity during the month.
7 Because we focus on joblessness and not unemployment, New Deal will not be compulsory for all
young people in the sample jobless for more than six months. New Deal does extend to single mothers
and disabled young people, however, but on a voluntary basis.
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spells of joblessness include having an unemployed father, coming from the west of
NI (a region of comparative deprivation), women with children, and coming from the
Catholic community. These patterns in the raw data generally have the expected sign,
with the exceptions of the local unemployment rate, previous joblessness and previous
wage.
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4. Results and Discussion
Below we discuss the results of estimation of the PG model with and without
unobserved heterogeneity. In each case, we first treat all exits as pooled and then
identify exits to employment and exits to education/training separately. Estimation is
carried out on the whole sample, due to sample size.8 Estimation of the PG and Meyer
models uses the Jenkins (1997) procedure for Stata.
The PG model set out in Equation 3 (repeated below) assumes a piecewise constant
specification for the baseline hazard function. An extension of the model introduced
by Meyer (1990) explicitly models unobserved heterogeneity using a gamma
distribution, as shown in Equation 3a.
hjt(Xit) = 1 – exp{ -exp[Xit’βj + θj(t)]} (3)
hjt(Xit) = 1 – exp{ -exp[Xit’βj + θj(t) + log(e)]}           (3a)
where e is a gamma distributed random variable with unit mean and variance σ2. An
alternative extension replaces the gamma distributed error term with a normally
distributed error term in order to check robustness.
The interval-specific baseline hazard can only be identified for those duration
intervals in which exits occur (Jenkins, 1997). In addition, the adequacy of the
asymptotic normal approximations may be suspect if some time intervals include very
few failures (Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978). Jenkins therefore suggests additional
grouping of duration intervals for which the number of events is small in order to
improve estimation precision. In our application, given the gaps in the distribution of
durations shown in Figure 3, and our small sample size overall, we need to group
duration intervals.9 We therefore specify the following groups of duration intervals:
separate groups for months 1-12, 13-15 months, 16-21 months, 22-24 months, 25-36
months and 37+ months. At least one of these duration interval dummies must be
                                                          
8 Results from estimation of the model for pooled exits, separately by gender, are available from the
authors on request and are briefly discussed later in this section.
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omitted for the equation to be identified – we omit the one-month and 37+ months
interval dummies.
The results of the PG model for pooled exits and for exits to employment and
education/training separately are presented in Table 4. While the PG model appears
well specified for the pooled exits and exits to employment, it is less so for exits to
education treated separately. This is unsurprising given the small number of exits to
education/training in the data set. Our discussion concentrates on the pooled exits and
the exits to employment, although the estimates for the exits to education/training
model are reported for completeness.10 The Meyer (1990) extension introducing a
gamma distribution modelling unobserved heterogeneity is an insignificant addition to
the PG model for pooled exits and exits to employment, as is the alternative normal
specification for heterogeneity. The Meyer extension cannot be estimated for exits to
education and training because of the small number of such exits in the sample. The
insignificance of unobserved heterogeneity is a common finding in studies that adopt
the PG model (e.g. Carling et al., 1996; Boheim and Taylor, 2000).11 We therefore
follow Boheim and Taylor (2000) in reporting only the results from the standard PG
model without unobserved heterogeneity.
Pooled Exits
Not all duration dummies are significant in the pooled model and between seven and
fifteen months it is not possible to discern any strong pattern of duration dependence
(although the general trend appears to be negative but not strongly). Nevertheless a
clear downward sloping pattern emerges up to seven months duration and beyond
fifteen months duration, with a slight non-linearity at five months duration. In other
words, there is clear negative duration dependence, at least initially, which suggests a
loss of employability as jobless spells continue beyond the first month. The local
peak, or ‘spike’, in the baseline hazard at five months is within a standard error of the
                                                                                                                                                                     
9 Inference on β and the survivor function estimator should nevertheless be relatively robust to the
small number of failures in some specific time intervals (Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978).
10 In any case, as Boheim and Taylor (2000) point out, the estimated coefficients for the pooled model
are essentially a weighted average of the impact of the covariates on the probability of exit into
different states, in our case into employment or into education and training.
11 Carling et al. (1996), for example, find the addition of Meyer-type unobserved heterogeneity to be
irrelevant, with the variance of the gamma mixing distribution approaching zero.
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baseline hazard at four and six months, so we cannot strongly reject negative duration
dependence over the first six months. Figure 4 shows the baseline hazard function
from the parsimonious PG model for pooled exits, calculated for the average young
person.12
Despite its statistical insignificance, the spike in the baseline hazard function at five
months is of potential interest. Spikes are sometimes found around the time of benefit
exhaustion or reduction (e.g. Carling et al., 1996). Young jobless aged 16 and 17 are
in most cases not entitled to benefits. Above this age, the JSA has brought in a benefit
regime in which the level of benefits can be reduced after six months of
unemployment under certain conditions.13 It is unlikely, however, that many young
people will be subject to this benefit threshold effect of JSA. A more likely possibility
is that the spike is capturing an effect of New Deal. After six months of claiming
unemployment benefits, most young people are required to enter the New Deal or lose
entitlement to benefits. This may be enough to stimulate additional job search (or the
search for a training or education place) at five months. If we consider the spike to
extend to six months (as it does for exits to employment), it may be that the baseline
hazard function is also capturing an effect where some young people are helped
rapidly out of joblessness on entry to New Deal.14
If the spike at 5-6 months is a New Deal effect, then we would expect to see a contrast
in the shapes of the baseline hazard functions before and after the introduction of New
Deal. Our sample period contains New Deal’s introduction, so in principle we can
examine this question. In practice, however, the sample is too small to examine the
post-New Deal period in isolation. We can, however, estimate the model for pooled
exits for that part of the sample period that falls before the introduction of New Deal.
                                                          
12 The average young person has all dummies set to 0 (the sample mean of all dummies is below 0.5)
and continuous variables set to their sample means. She is female, Protestant, 18.6 years old, with less
than five GCSEs at grades A-C. She has nine months of work experience (including training
placements) with a previous (take-home) wage of £50-£100 per week and two months previous
experience of joblessness. Her father is in employment but not in a managerial, professional or related
occupation, and she lives in the south, north or east of NI, facing an unemployment rate of 20.5% in her
area. She does not have children and began her jobless spell before JSA or New Deal were introduced,
applying for one job per month during her jobless spell.
13 If sufficient contributions have been made during previous employment and if means-testing would
result in lower benefit payments after the contributions-based benefit had been exhausted (six months).
14 The spike for the exits to employment competing risks model is not within a standard error of the
baseline hazard at seven months.
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We do not report the parameter estimates for this restricted sample period model, but
Figure 5 gives the resulting baseline hazard function for the average pre-New Deal
young person. There is no spike for the pre-New Deal sample, which appears to
support our speculation that the spike in the full-sample baseline hazard may be a
New Deal effect. If we could estimate post New Deal in isolation, our guess is that
this spike would be more pronounced.
Torelli and Trivelato (1993) present evidence of substantial measurement errors in
retrospective survey data. In particular, they show how recall error of unemployment
spells can lead to spikes in the duration distribution at certain points, such as six
months, 12 months, 24 months etc., or ‘heaping’. At first glance, this seems an
alternative potential explanation of the spike at six months. There are spikes in the
duration distribution at 24 months and 48 months in the Status Zero Survey data (see
Figure 3). These spikes are small, however, and there is little evidence of a similar
effect at six months or 12 months, so we conclude our spike is not a result of
measurement error.15 In general, given the relative absence of heaping in our data, and
given that we have in any case grouped durations, we take no explicit account of
heaping in the model. In further support, Kraus and Steiner (1998) find parameter
estimates to be insensitive to explicit specification of heaping.
The model for the full sample period contains two step dummies for New Deal (see
Section 3 for details) which are intended to capture the effects of New Deal on the
hazard rate. Our prior for the second dummy (NEWDEAL2), which takes the value
one for all eligible individual-months, is that it will have a positive sign (increase the
conditional probability of exit). At least for those claiming JSA benefits, continued
joblessness becomes more difficult on eligibility for New Deal. Young people are
instead offered guidance and assistance in moving out of joblessness into education,
training or employment (during the Gateway stage), and then a number of options
including subsidised employment should the initial Gateway stage prove
unsuccessful. The expected sign of the other New Deal dummy (NEWDEAL1) is less
clear. It is negatively correlated with duration in the raw data, which suggests
durations are shorter since New Deal’s introduction. But if the NEWDEAL2 dummy
                                                          
15 The Status Zero Survey is a face-to-face interview based survey, which may reduce such recall error
compared to postal or telephone surveys.
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controls for the beneficial effects of New Deal on those young people eligible for its
assistance, it is possible that NEWDEAL1 might capture negative substitution-type
effects. Jobless young people existing in a world with New Deal that are nevertheless
outside New Deal may receive less job offers than competitors within New Deal, or
than they might have received before the introduction of New Deal, for a variety of
reasons. First, young people outside of New Deal may receive less assistance with job
search if scarce Employment Service resources are concentrated on those in New
Deal. Second, young people outside New Deal may be less attractive to employers
given that they can hire subsidised employees through New Deal (see e.g. Riley and
Young, 2001). Third, young people outside New Deal may feel less incentive to job
search if they know they are shortly to enter New Deal and receive the help and
guidance that entails.
The estimated sign on the NEWDEAL2 dummy is indeed positive in the pooled
model, although insignificant (see Table 4). The weakness of this effect might be
explained by its voluntary nature for some jobless young people, notably single
parents, for whom it may have made little practical difference. When the sample is
restricted to spells of ILO unemployment only, NEWDEAL2 becomes slightly more
significant (at 20%) with the same sign. A purely statistical explanation of the
weakness of this effect lies in the possibility of the dummy being endogenous. In
other words, the value of the dummy may be influenced by the hazard rate up to six
months – those more likely to exit joblessness early are less likely to become eligible
for New Deal. If this is the case, however, we know the sign of the bias on the
NEWDEAL2 coefficient will be negative. The estimated coefficient in Table 4 should
therefore be interpreted as a lower bound on the New Deal eligibility effect – it may
be stronger.
The estimated sign for the NEWDEAL1 dummy suggests the opposite – jobless spells
in general have increased in duration following the introduction of New Deal, other
things being equal, although again the effect is not statistically significant. Such a
result is not without precedent. Carling et al. (1996) find little effect of Active Labour
Market Policies on the hazard rate to employment in Sweden, for example. Van Ours
et al. (2000) argue that active labour market policies in Switzerland may actually have
a ‘prolonging’ effect on unemployment duration, at least for men. Riley and Young
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(2001) find some weak evidence of a negative New Deal effect on some of those
outside the programme. Despite its weakness, does this result suggest there may be
some marginal level of negative substitution-type effects following the introduction of
New Deal?
Similar to the NEWDEAL1 dummy, a dummy is included for JSA (zero for all
individual-months before October 1996 and one thereafter). Our prior for this is a
positive sign, given that JSA was intended to intensify job search activities for the
unemployed. This is indeed what the results suggest, so the introduction of JSA does
seem to be significantly correlated with shorter joblessness spells. The effect is quite
large, with hazard rates around a third higher for jobless individuals following the
introduction of JSA.16
Turning to the other covariates, the pooled model suggests that joblessness duration is
increasing with age. The results suggest that hazard rates for 17 year olds may be as
much as twice those for otherwise identical 21 year olds. With a single cohort it is
possible that the negative coefficient on the age variable is also capturing some other
time-related effect, however, so we are reluctant to interpret it as entirely an age
effect. In the unemployment duration literature as a whole, age is widely accepted as a
significant determinant of the probability of exiting unemployment and getting a job,
with older workers less likely to get re-employed (e.g. Narendranathan and Stewart,
1993; Stancanelli, 1999; Firth et al., 1999; Kettunen, 1997; Bloeman, 1997). Studies
of young people specifically have drawn mixed conclusions of the age/duration
relationship. Russell and O’Connell (2001), for example, find a significant negative
effect of age on duration of unemployment spell in several European countries.
Heckman and Borjas (1980) and Lynch (1989) find no significant relationship in the
US.
Boheim and Taylor (2000) find mothers have reduced exit rates to employment
compared to childless women. Bratberg and Vaage (2000) find similar reduced exit
rates for mothers with children under five years of age. Firth et al. (1999) find the
opposite for women with children over five years of age. In our model the interactive
                                                          
16 We do not examine the quality of these faster job matches in this paper.
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dummy for women with children (although we do not have information on the age of
children, there are likely to be few women with children over five years old in the
sample) is negative and significant. In other words, joblessness duration is higher for
young women with children than for others in the sample. Given our broad definition
of joblessness, some young women with children in the sample will be largely
disengaged from the labour market, so this result is unsurprising. The scale of this
effect suggests that having a child roughly halves hazard rates for otherwise identical
females. Gender is otherwise insignificant in the pooled model, as is
religion/community.17 Boheim and Taylor (2000) also find hazard rates to be similar
for males and females in GB.
When the (pooled) model is estimated separately for males and females, covariate
estimates are broadly similar, as are the estimated baseline hazard functions, albeit
less precise. There are a number of differences, however, between the genders. The
effects of having an unemployed father and the effects of number of job applications
are not significant for females whereas they are for males. On the other hand, males
do not display a significant JSA effect. Perhaps most interesting is that the
NEWDEAL2 dummy is significant (and positive) for males when estimated
separately, but insignificant for females. In other words, there is a positive effect of
New Deal eligibility on the hazard rate for young males. Again this should be
considered as a lower bound due to the fact that we cannot rule out some negative bias
on this coefficient. This is consistent with the suggestion that jobless females caring
for children (and therefore outside of the compulsory New Deal) are pulling down the
size of the effect in the full sample. Figure 6 gives baseline hazard functions for
pooled exits for the average female and average male. Hazard rates are higher for
females than for males at short durations and the spike at five months is more
pronounced for females, though this will be partly offset by the significance of the
NEWDEAL2 dummy for males.18 Otherwise the functions are broadly similar.
                                                          
17 Crouchley et al. (1991) find unemployment duration to be longer for Catholics than for Protestants in
NI, other things being equal, but do not examine young people separately.
18 The effect of this dummy is not shown on the hazard function for males since dummies are set to
zero for the ‘average’ young male. For those eligible, however, the hazard rate shown in Figure 6
would essentially shift upwards from six months onwards.
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Our two general measures of social background are dummies for father unemployed
and dummies for father managerial, professional or related. Neither is strongly
significant in the pooled model, although father unemployed increases joblessness
duration with marginal significance and to a small extent. This latter result is
consistent with existing studies of joblessness and disadvantage (e.g. Dearden et al.,
1997), although we have found no existing duration study which controls for father’s
employment status. The negative effect of having an unemployed father may capture
both attitudes and aspirations, and the importance of informal job search through
family contacts (see, e.g. Hannan, 1998). The insignificant effect of father managerial,
professional or related may reflect offsetting effects of attitudes and aspirations and
wealth effects, which might on their own prolong jobless spells (e.g. Bloeman and
Stancanelli, 2001).
Numerous studies have found education level or years of schooling to reduce the
duration of unemployment spells (e.g. Bradley and Taylor, 1991; Narendranathan and
Stewart, 1993; Carling et al., 1996; Bratberg and Nilsen, 2000; Firth et al., 1999;
Wolbers, 2000). We include a binary dummy for achieving five or more GCSE passes
at grades A*-C by the end of compulsory education. The results for the pooled model
suggest, although the effect of having good qualifications on probability of exit from
joblessness is positive, it is not significant. Kettunen (1997) finds a non-linear
relationship between education and duration, argued to be the result of high
reservation wages counteracting the higher arrival rate of job offers for the highly
educated. It may be that these two effects counteract one another in our model, where
education is captured by a single binary dummy. Many young people have no
previous employment experience and therefore no previous wage data on which to
base a measure of reservation wages, so it is unlikely that our previous wage variable,
itself insignificant, entirely controls for this reservation wage effect.
Two other personal characteristics are included in the model. First, previous
employment experience is included (number of months in employment prior to the
jobless spell), but is not significant. Information on work experience during school
would be advantageous here, but is not present in the data set. Second, to capture any
unemployment scarring effects, a variable is included for months of joblessness
experienced prior to the current jobless spell. Heckman and Borjas (1980) refer to this
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as occurrence dependence, and evidence of unemployment scarring for GB has
recently been found by Narendranathan and Elias (1993), Narendranathan and Stewart
(1993), Arulampalam et al. (2000), and Boheim and Taylor (2000). In our case
however, perhaps given that most jobless spells in our sample are first spells, this
variable is insignificant. Binary dummies for previous employment and joblessness
are similarly insignificant.
Two variables are included in the model to capture aspects of the jobless spell itself.
Firstly, we include a variable for the average number of job applications made by the
individual per month of the jobless spell.19 We expect young people that search more
intensely for jobs to experience shorter jobless durations, as suggested by the search
model. This is indeed the case as shown in Table 4, although the magnitude of the
effect is not large – applying for one more job per month adds around 2% to the
hazard rate. Information on job search intensity has not been available for many of the
data sets used to analyse unemployment duration, which may explain the omission of
such measures from many existing studies (Chuang, 1999, is a recent exception).
Secondly, a small number of the jobless spells in our sample can be categorised as
holidays. Such spells are likely to differ in nature to other jobless spells, with little or
no job search, for example, and perhaps a pre-arranged entry into employment,
education or training in some cases.20 In the pooled model the holiday variable is,
however, insignificant.
Economic environmental factors can influence unemployment duration. Lynch (1989)
and Arulampalam and Stewart (1995) find local unemployment rates to be a
significant determinant of unemployment duration (Stancanelli, 1999, finds local
unemployment rates to be insignificant). Bloeman (1997) finds significant area
dummies. Two local economic environment measures are included in the model – the
travel to work area (TTWA) adult unemployment rate (in the absence of a youth
unemployment rate by local area) and a binary dummy for living in the West of NI (a
region of relative social and economic deprivation). Neither the local unemployment
                                                          
19 Month-specific information on job search is not available.
20 These will include summer holidays between educational institutions as well as ‘gap years’, for
example.
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rate nor the West dummy is significantly related to jobless durations for young people
in our model, other things being equal.
Exits to Employment and Education/Training
The estimates of the parameters for the independent competing risks model for exit to
employment are also shown in Table 4. Again many of the duration group dummies
are insignificant, suggesting no strong relationship between duration and the hazard
rate beyond eight months. However, similarly to the pooled model, there is evidence
of negative duration dependence over the first four months of duration, followed by a
small rise in the baseline hazard in months five and six. This spike, centred on six
months rather than five months, is the main driver of the pooled spike interpreted
earlier as a New Deal effect.21 The baseline hazard for exits to employment is shown
in Figure 4.
Many of the covariates that drop out of the pooled model also drop out of the exits to
employment model. The exception is the holiday dummy, which here is significant
and negative. In other words, those young people describing themselves as on holiday
have lower exit probabilities to employment than others. This, coupled with the
insignificance of the term in the pooled regression, suggests that holidays are mostly
taken between education spells (e.g. gap years or summer breaks). Unsurprisingly
there is a positive coefficient on the holiday dummy in the exits to education/training
model.
All variables significant in both the pooled and the exits to employment model have
the same sign in both models. Older young people, young women with children, and
young people with unemployed fathers all experience longer joblessness duration.
Young people engaging in more job search experience shorter joblessness duration.
This effect is stronger in the exits to employment model than in the pooled exits
model, and is insignificant in exits to education/training. The JSA dummy also has a
stronger positive effect on exit probability than in the pooled model, also
                                                          
21 The spike at five months in the pooled exits model reflects some weighted average of the spike at six
months for exits to employment and a spike at five months for exits to education/training (see Figure
4).
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corresponding with its insignificance in the exits to education/training model. The
introduction of stricter rules on job search for those claiming unemployment benefits
seems to have paid off in terms of reducing joblessness duration among young people
in NI. It has been argued that, rather than leading to increased employment, JSA may
have led many previously unemployed people, particularly from older age groups, to
move out of the labour market altogether on to alternative benefits not covered by the
new job search rules (e.g. see Beatty and Fothergill, 1999). Our results, given our
broad definition of joblessness, suggest this is not the case for young people.
There are few exits to education/training in the sample so we do not place too much
emphasis on the parameter estimates in columns six and seven of Table 4. There is
little discernible pattern to the baseline hazard function (most duration group
dummies are insignificant), as shown in Figure 4. Older young people and young
women with children appear less likely to exit joblessness into education or training.
Those describing themselves as on holiday are more likely to exit to
education/training. Perhaps most interestingly, two variables are found to be
significant which are not in the other models. Firstly, young people with good
qualifications at the end of compulsory education have increased exit probability to
education/training. This is consistent with those studies finding education level or
years of schooling to reduce the duration of unemployment, and also the literature on
post-compulsory participation in education (e.g. Rice, 1999). Secondly, those young
people with more previous employment experience are less likely to exit joblessness
into education/training. Once the decision to enter the labour market has been made,
and young people have been employed, they appear to be unlikely to return to
education/training, even if jobless.
Finally, we re-estimate the pooled exits model restricting the sample to ILO
unemployment spells only, to test the robustness of our results to our broad definition
of joblessness.22 We have already suggested that the effects of the New Deal
dummies, though still insignificant at conventional levels, are slightly stronger in the
ILO model. Otherwise the results are very similar to those for the pooled model
estimated on the full jobless sample, both in terms of the shape of the baseline hazard
                                                          
22 Results available from the authors on request.
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and the effects of the covariates on the hazard rate. The main difference is that the
mother with child variable, as we might expect given the more restrictive definition of
unemployment, becomes insignificant.
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6. Concluding Remarks
The paper examines the duration of jobless spells for a sample of young people in NI
between 1993 and 1999. Separate routes out of joblessness are identified – into
employment or into education and training – in contrast to much of the existing
literature, which treats education together with joblessness other than unemployment
as a single ‘out of the labour force’ state. Duration dependence is shown to be
generally negative, i.e. it gets harder to exit joblessness the longer one has been
jobless. This suggests that targeted policy intervention during the first month of
joblessness may be a useful policy addition to current intervention, which focuses on
young people that have been jobless for six months or more (during which time
employability has been deteriorating). Where it is possible, prevention is likely to be
better than cure both in financial terms and in reducing psychological costs to jobless
young people themselves.
Although generally downward sloping, the hazard function also displays a spike
around 5-6 month’s duration for both pooled exits and exits to employment. We argue
that this spike corresponds with an effect of the introduction New Deal. The model
suggests a further New Deal effect, captured by a dummy variable, but only
significant for males: there is a positive shift in the hazard function from six months
duration onwards following the introduction of New Deal. In other words, exit
probabilities increase for male jobless on eligibility for New Deal.
There is a clear need for more detailed research on the effects of New Deal on the
duration of joblessness for young people, not only in NI but also elsewhere in the UK.
This paper provides a framework for such further research, and provides some
exploratory analysis, but with a small sample and no suitable control group cannot
claim to provide definitive evidence of the effects of New Deal. Such evidence is
likely to be available from register data, however, covering large numbers of
individuals and allowing use of the 25-29 year old age group (not covered by New
Deal) as a control group. This is the next stage of our research. Of course, the benefits
of register data will come at a cost in terms of detail on covariates and exclusion of
those jobless young people not covered by claimant counts. Taken together, however,
the present study based on survey data, and the suggested study of register data, are
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likely to provide a strong evidence base for policy makers to ensure New Deal is
having its intended, and widely supported, effects.
The introduction of JSA is correlated with shorter jobless spells for young people
through increased exit rates to employment. In other words, JSA has been successful
in turning greater pressure for job search into faster job matches, at least for young
people in NI over our sample period. In general, greater job search activity is shown
to reduce joblessness duration. The main observable barriers to exit from joblessness
include caring for a young child and having a family background of unemployment.
Having poor qualifications also acts as a barrier, particularly to exit into education.
Overall, where significant, the estimated effects of the covariates are generally
consistent with those suggested by search theory.
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Table 1: Cohort Proportions with Unemployment and Joblessness Spells
Proportion of Cohort Jobless Spell, % ILO Unemployment Spell, %
At least one spell 35 27
At least one spell ≥ 3 months 29 22
At least one spell ≥ 6 months 24 17
At least one spell ≥ 12 months 17 12
Source: McVicar et al. (2000). Note: Weighted sample proportions.
Table 2: Joblessness Duration by Destination State (% Survival)
Duration (months)
Exit 1 2 3 4 5 6 9 12 18 24 36
All 92 75 64 59 54 50 40 30 19 11 08
Emp 94 72 63 58 53 47 39 27 21 08 04
Ed/tr 80 66 45 37 31 27 19 14 06 03 02
Notes: Figures show (i) % of all jobless spells with duration of n+ months (including censored spells),
(ii) % of all jobless spells ending in employment with duration of n+ months, (iii) % of all jobless
spells ending in education/training with duration of n+ months. Unweighted.
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Table 3: Sample Means of Explanatory Variables and Correlation with Duration
Explanatory Variable Sample Mean
(Standard Deviation)
Correlation with
Duration
GCSE5 (1=yes) .236 (.425) -.153
Father unemployed (1=yes) .244 (.430) .110
Male (1=yes) .483 (.500) -.073
Catholic (1=yes) .483 (.500) .193
Previous employment (mts) 8.81 (14.0) -.128
Previous wage* 1.09 (1.38) -.121
Previous joblessness (mts) 2.24 (5.67) -.140
Father SOC Group 1 (1=yes) .188 (.391) .020
JSA .466 (.499) -.215
New Deal 1 .177 (.382) -.299
New Deal 2 .108 (.311) -.089
Age at start of spell (yrs) 18.6 (1.84) -.273
West of NI (1=yes) .199 (.400) .102
On holiday (1=yes) .065 (.246) -.121
Mother (have child * female) .101 (.302) .314
Job applications (monthly mean) 1.00 (2.03) -.274
TTWA Unemployment Rate 20.5 (6.41) -.320
Notes: *Previous wage data is recorded in £50 bands, 1=0-£50, 6=£250+. Observations are
unweighted.
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Table 4: PG Model, Pooled Exits and Competing Risks, Males and Females
Pooled Exits Exits to Employment Exits to
Education/Training
Inclusive
Model
Parsimonious
Model
Inclusive
Model
Parsimonious
Model
Inclusive
Model
Parsimonious
Model
Constant 3.88*
(1.53)
4.85*
(1.03)
3.08
(1.83)
4.33*
(1.21)
2.45
(2.77)
3.54*
(1.59)
Month 2 1.73*
(.23)
1.75*
(.22)
2.33*
(.31)
2.32*
(.29)
.42
(.40)
.43
(.38)
Month 3 1.30*
(.26)
1.38*
(.24)
1.54*
(.36)
1.52*
(.34)
.89*
(.37)
.93*
(.35)
Month 4 .69*
(.37)
.81*
(.35)
1.09*
(.51)
1.20*
(.49)
.10
(.57)
.25
(.53)
Month 5 .88*
(.34)
.92*
(.32)
1.25*
(.44)
1.26*
(.42)
.16
(.65)
.39
(.53)
Month 6 .67*
(.34)
.72*
(.33)
1.33*
(.40)
1.37*
(.38)
-1.05
(1.06)
-1.01
(1.02)
Month 7 .02
(.44)
.09
(.42)
.79
(.48)
.77
(.45)
-1.20
(1.09)
-.85
(1.03)
Month 8 .13
(.49)
.04
(.47)
.78
(.63)
.70
(.62)
-.68
(.80)
-.83
(.77)
Month 9 -.01
(.40)
.07
(.40)
.47
(.49)
.49
(.48)
-.84
(.78)
0.64
(.75)
Month 10 -.28
(.35)
-.21
(.35)
.42
(.42)
.47
(.41)
-1.56*
(.77)
-1.55*
(.76)
Month 11 -.41
(.78)
-.25
(.73)
1.13
(1.10)
1.15
(1.07)
-1.66
(1.10)
-1.88
(1.09)
Month 12 -.73
(.43)
-.62
(.41)
-.24
(.52)
-.24
(.50)
-1.27
(.78)
-1.38
(.77)
Month 13-
15
-.43
(.30)
-.37
(.29)
-.21
(.42)
-.14
(.41)
-.63
(.45)
-.69
(.44)
Month 16-
21
-.62
(.34)
-.64
(.33)
-.01
(.40)
-.01
(.38)
-2.01
(1.04)
-2.07*
(1.02)
Month 22-
24
-.85*
(.39)
-.84*
(.39)
-.34
(.45)
-.35
(.44)
-1.76
(1.04)
-1.62
(1.02)
Month 25-
36
-1.32*
(.45)
-1.35*
(.44)
-.59
(.48)
-.56
(.47)
-17.91
(1622.01)
-17.88
(1622.44)
Age -.36*
(.08)
-.4-*
(.06)
-.38*
(.10)
-.43*
(.07)
-.29*
(.14)
-.36*
(.09)
Male -.06
(.14)
-.01
(.16)
-.19
(.25)
Catholic -.13
(.15)
-.13
(.18)
-.13
(.29)
Child -1.13*
(.30)
-1.01*
(.28)
-.87*
(.34)
-.74*
(.32)
-1.83*
(.65)
-1.75*
(.62)
Father U -.26
(.17)
-.30
(.16)
-.35
(.20)
-.35
(.19)
.07
(.29)
Father
SOC1
-.01
(.17)
-.14
(.22)
.32
(.30)
GCSE5 .22
(.16)
.05
(.20)
.59*
(.27)
.62*
(.26)
Previous U .01
(.01)
.00
(.02)
.06
(.04)
Previous E -.00
(.01)
.01
(.01)
-.10*
(.04)
-.10*
(.04)
Previous
wage
.01
(.08)
.03
(.09)
-.01
(.20)
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Table 4: Model, Pooled Exits and Competing Risks, Males and Females cont.
Pooled Exits Exits to Employment Exits to
Education/Training
Inclusive
Model
Parsimonious
Model
Inclusive
Model
Parsimonious
Model
Inclusive
Model
Parsimonious
Model
No. Job
applications
.05
(.03)
.05
(.03)
.07*
(.03)
.07*
(.03)
.05
(.07)
Holiday -.01
(.26)
-1.68*
(.63)
-1.72*
(.62)
.91*
(.34)
.98*
(.31)
Local U rate .01
(.02)
.02
(.02)
-.00
(.03)
West of NI -.25
(.21)
-.36
(.25)
.02
(.38)
JSA .72*
(.23)
.74*
(.21)
1.23*
(.27)
1.22*
(.26)
-.58
(.52)
New Deal 1 -.31
(.29)
-.26
(.32)
-1.42
(1.01)
New Deal 2 .48
(.35)
.44
(.38)
1.83
(1.02)
χ2 311.06*
(32)
303.73*
(20)
214.72*
(32)
209.32*
(21)
192.17*
(32)
185.93*
(20)
Log L -702.69 -706.35 -548.61 -551.31 -276.85 -280.32
Notes: * denotes significant at 5%. The χ2 statistic tests the explanatory power of the model compared
to the intercept-only model (degrees of freedom in parentheses). Parameters reported for explanatory
variables are coefficients (standard errors in parentheses).
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Figure 1: Number of Spells of Joblessness, October 1993-March 1999
Source: ‘Young People and Social Exclusion in Northern Ireland: Status 0 Four Years
On’. Department of Higher and Further Education, Training and Employment. Belfast,
2000. Notes: No sample members experienced more than four spells of non-
participation. Figures are rounded, based on weighted sample proportions.
Figure 2: Frequency Distribution of Duration, Months
Notes: Includes censored spells. Unweighted.
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Figure 3: Proportion of Cohort Jobless, 1993-1999
Notes: Figures give number of jobless as a proportion of the cohort. Weighted.
Figure 4: Baseline Hazard Rates, PG Model, Pooled Exits
and Competing Risks, ‘Average Young Person’
Note: All dummies are set to zero, continuous variables are set to their sample means.
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Figure 5: Baseline Hazards, Pooled Exits,
Full Sample Period and Pre-New Deal Sample Period
Note: Pre-New Deal sample period = spells starting July 1993 – March 1998, inclusive. Spells
ending after March 1998 are treated as right-censored. All dummies set to zero, continuous
variables set to sample means.
Figure 6: Baseline Hazards, ‘Average’ Male, ‘Average’ Female, Pooled Exits
Note: All dummies set to zero, continuous variables set to (gender-specific) sample means.
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